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Abstract 
We investigate whether dividend changes signal firms’ future profitability by considering 
firms’ earnings volatility and examining how earnings volatility affects dividend signaling. In gen-
eral, we find a positive relation between dividend increases on firms’ future earnings. In other 
words, dividend increases tend to signal positive changes in future earnings. However, the effect 
largely depends on the firms’ earnings volatility such that higher earnings volatility tends to miti-
gate the signaling effect of dividend increases on future earnings. Specifically, for firms that have 
high earnings volatility, dividend increases seem to signal a reduction in future earnings volatility 
rather than an increase in future earnings. On the other hand, we find no consistent results for 
dividend decreases. Our findings have three main implications: 1) The traditional dividend signal-
ing theory is valid; 2) the effect of signaling depends on a firm’s earnings volatility; 3) for high-
volatility firms, positive dividend changes signal earnings volatility reductions rather than earnings 
increases.  
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1 Introduction  
Positive market reactions to dividend changes are well documented in the literature. When divi-
dends are initiated or increased, stock prices typically go up, and conversely, when dividends are 
omitted or cut, prices fall, as documented by Pettit (1972), Charest (1978), Aharony and Swary 
(1980), Brickley (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995). It 
is therefore proposed that changes in dividend policy could act as a signaling device to the general 
market regarding firms’ future prospects (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; and Mil-
ler and Rock, 1985). This is also called the traditional dividend signaling hypothesis. However, 
whether dividend changes have longer term effects on firms’ future profitability, generally meas-
ured by changes in earnings, is still unclear.  
In fact, the existence of dividend signaling on firms’ future profitability, or whether divi-
dend changes convey new information about future earnings, has been controversial in academic 
finance for decades. Many studies regarding this issue have been conducted, but no consensus has 
been reached. In particular, Nissim and Ziv (2001), by developing a linear model of earnings ex-
pectations, find that positive dividend changes are positively associated with firms’ future earn-
ings. However, after constructing a similar model that incorporates nonlinearity in earnings expec-
tations, Grullon, Michaely and Thaler (2005) find no evidence that dividend increases could signal 
increases in future earnings. Because of these mixed results in the finance literature, the question 
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of whether dividend changes signal future earnings still remains somewhat a mystery. This re-
search is an attempt to resolve this controversy by revisiting the subject matter based on firms’ 
earnings volatility.  
We notice that most prior studies look into the direct relation between dividend changes 
and changes in future earnings; they overlook the possibility that the effect of dividend changes 
on future profitability could depend on a third factor that moderates the relation. The omission of 
this term could lead to ambiguous empirical results. Inspired by the signaling model developed by 
Lintner (1956) and Bhattacharya (1979), we hypothesize that earnings volatility could be one such 
factor that distorts the direct relation between dividend changes and future profitability. We 
thereby hypothesize that there is a positive association between changes in dividends and future 
profitability; however, this association is conditional on a firm’s specific earnings volatility. Spe-
cifically, we propose that the positive association between dividend increases and future earnings 
changes is mitigated by higher current earnings volatility, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, we hy-
pothesize that for firms with high earnings volatility, a dividend increase signals a reduction in 
future earnings volatility rather than an increase in future earnings; for firms with low volatility, a 
dividend increase signals higher future earnings. We have no conclusive prediction regarding div-
idend decreases as a dividend decrease could signal either lower future earnings or higher future 
earnings volatility regardless of current volatility levels.  
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We first adopt similar methodologies as in Nissim and Ziv (2001) and   Grullon et al. (2005) 
to verify that their results hold in our sample. We then modify their regression models by consid-
ering current earnings volatility. We use both linear and nonlinear models in order to test whether 
our results are subject to different assumptions of earnings expectations. We obtain our data from 
the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly event files and Compustat Monthly 
updates database. Our results provide strong evidence that changes in dividends, increases in par-
ticular, have positive association with firms’ future earnings profitability. However, earnings vol-
atility mitigates this signaling effect. Specifically, we find that for firms with low earnings volatil-
ity, a dividend increase signals an increase in future earnings; whereas for firms with high earnings 
volatility, a dividend increase signals a reduction in future earnings volatility rather than changes 
in earnings. As expected, we do not find any conclusive result regarding dividend decreases. Our 
evidence suggests that firms might change their dividend policies due to an expected change in 
future earnings volatility. The higher current earnings volatility is, the more likely a dividend in-
crease is a result of an expected volatility change. Our findings provide an explanation of the in-
consistent results in the literature regarding the information content of dividend changes. They can 
also help investors better interpret dividend changes and adjust their investments accordingly. As 
such, this research is not only of academic significance, but it is also of great practical value. 
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We make at least three contributions to the finance literature. First, we find new and con-
sistent evidence that supports the traditional dividend signaling theory based on two previous mod-
els that generate contradictory results. Thus, our results are robust to different earnings expecta-
tions model and specifications. Second, we are the first to investigate the interaction effect of earn-
ings volatility on the signaling of dividend changes. Third, our findings imply that dividend 
changes signal not only the future expected level of earnings but also the expected volatility of 
earnings; we show that changes in dividends, especially dividend increases, could signal an ex-
pected volatility reduction for high-volatility firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and 
presents our hypotheses development. Section 3 describes data and methodology. Empirical results 
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 The Traditional Dividend Signaling Hypothesis 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) first suggest that dividends could possibly contain information about 
firms’ future profitability. They contend that in perfect and complete capital markets, a firm’s 
dividend policy should be irrelevant to firm value and investors’ positions as investors can create 
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homemade dividends from the sale of a portion of their shares. Furthermore, prior to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, individual stockholders with at least six months holding history paid a higher 
tax rate on ordinary dividends (50%) than on capital gains (20%) (Bolster and Janjigian, 1991). 
The Act removed the tax benefit for capital gains over dividends. However, as taxes on capital 
gains can be easily deferred, a tax disadvantage for dividend payout still exists. As a result, it seems 
that the optimal strategy for corporations should have been to minimize dividend payments. In 
spite of this, firms still pay dividends to this day. Since Miller and Modigliani’s dividend irrele-
vance theory, many hypotheses have been raised to rationalize firms’ dividend paying behavior.  
Some researchers propose that firms pay dividends as a signaling device to outside inves-
tors. Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) maintain that 
changes in dividends, acting as costly signaling tools, could be sent intentionally by insiders to 
convey information on firms’ future prospects. They believe management is likely to have more 
information about the current status and future prospects of their firm than general investors. Their 
decisions to increase or decrease dividends might convey some inside information that investors 
do not know. Outsiders, who lack the capacity to obtain full information of a firm, tend to consider 
dividend change announcements to be critical for the valuation of the firm. Therefore, management 
can provide signals to the market through dividend policies.  
In order to be considered as credible signals of quality, dividend changes should be costly 
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to mimic for low quality firms. Bhattacharya (1979) views the signaling cost as a transaction cost 
of having to resort to relatively expensive outside financing when new capital has to be raised as 
a result of the increased dividend payment, whereas Miller and Rock (1985) maintain that the 
opportunity cost associated with the cash outflows of dividend payment is the major signaling cost. 
The signaling model developed by John and Williams (1985) considers taxes as the primary cost 
for dividend signaling. Nevertheless, they all believe dividend signaling, as costly as it is, is only 
logical for firms with good future prospects so that the cost might be worth bearing. Additionally, 
according to the signaling hypothesis, the market reactions to dividend increases are expected to 
be more favorable when dividends are taxed higher than capital gains and vice versa, as the cred-
ibility of a signal is associated with its cost. The research conducted by Bernheim and Wantz 
(1995) confirms this prediction, which in turn supports dividend signaling hypothesis.  
Based on interviews of 28 firms, Lintner (1956) suggests that earnings are the key factor 
in determining changes in dividends. He observes that most firms have a target payout ratio, and 
they adjust their dividends to earnings only when management believes earnings have increased 
permanently. As a result, investors would expect dividend increases to be accompanied by perma-
nent and positive shifts in future profits. Lintner (1956) further states that most firms take a slow 
process to adjust their dividends as they believe the market favors a stable dividend policy. He 
implies that dividend change decisions are a function of firms’ target payout ratios and the speed 
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of adjustment of current dividends to the target ratio. Since firms are reluctant to change their 
dividend policies, a dividend increase (decrease) indicates managements’ belief of a favorable 
(unfavorable) prospect of firms’ future earnings. His theory was later confirmed by Fama and 
Babiak (1968), among others. However, by surveying financial executives in 2002, Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely (2005) find that the relation between dividend payments and earnings has 
weakened and that target payout ratios and the speed of adjustment have become less important. 
Skinner (2008) contends that Lintner’s model still works if the model is fitted to total payout that 
includes both dividends and repurchases.   
Bhattacharya (1979) suggests that in an imperfect information setting, dividend changes 
reflect expected future cash flows and expected future cash flow volatility. Bradley, Capozza and 
Seguin (1998) propose the same. They argue that, “given the existence of a stock-price penalty 
associated with dividend cuts, managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when future 
cash flows are less certain” (p.555). Moreover, firms with higher expected cash flow volatility 
have lower payout ratios compared to firms with lower expected volatility (Capozza and Seguin, 
1998). Chay and Suh (2008) also document the significance of cash-flow uncertainty in determin-
ing corporate payout policy across countries.  
There are two strands of literature that empirically investigate the signaling content of div-
idends. The first looks at stock price reaction. It is well documented that market reacts positively 
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to dividend increases and negatively to dividend decreases (Pettit (1972), Charest (1978), Aharony 
and Swary (1980), Brickley (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 
(1995)).  The second strand looks at future profitability, which is our focus.  
To empirically test the relation between dividends and profitability, many quantitative 
studies have been conducted. However, there is no consensus. Watts (1973) is among the first to 
investigate this issue. He finds a positive coefficient of dividend changes on next year’s earnings, 
but the coefficient fails the t-test, which implies that the information content of dividend is trivial. 
Gonedes (1978) also finds an insignificant coefficient for dividend changes. Similarly, Penman 
(1983) finds that dividend changes contain little information and many firms do not adjust their 
dividend policy even though improved future earnings are expected. His findings suggest that ex-
pected future profitability might not be the only gauge firms consider when it comes to dividend 
policy changes.  
Even though previous studies fail to find evidence that supports dividend signaling, Brick-
ley (1983), using a small and restricted sample, finds earnings would increase significantly in the 
same year as dividends increase, as well as in the following year. Focusing on extreme situations 
of dividend initiations and omissions, Healy and Palepu (1988) find that dividend initiations are 
generally followed by rapidly increasing earnings for the two years after dividend announcements. 
For dividend omissions, they find that earnings would decline in the year of the announcement but 
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then increases in later years, which is against the prediction of dividend signaling. Similarly, Bulan, 
Subramanian and Tanlu (2007) find that a great number of omissions signal favorable future pro-
spects given they have solid fundamentals and low debt overhang. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1996), on the other hand, investigate dividend-changing firms which experienced an earn-
ings decline in the dividend-changing year following years of earnings growth and find little evi-
dence that supports dividend signaling.  
In addition, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), by conducting both categorical and 
regression analyses, find a strong association between dividend changes and contemporaneous 
earnings changes, but fail to find evidence of any relation between dividend changes and future 
earnings changes. They therefore maintain that the predictive value of dividend changes is mini-
mal, and that dividends signal the past rather than the future. Their findings were later confirmed 
by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002). They find that in the years following dividend-
increasing announcements, the future profitability of firms, which changed their dividends by more 
than 10%, decreased rather than increased as predicted by the dividend signaling hypothesis.  
 By developing a linear model that incorporates the ratio of earnings to the book value of 
equity (ROE), Nissim and Ziv (2001) find a positive relation between dividend increases and future 
earnings changes, future abnormal earnings and future probability levels in each of the two years 
following dividend change. They further argue that dividend changes have predictive content on 
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the level of firm’s future profitability, which is why dividend changes would trigger stock returns. 
They, however, find no affirmative relation between dividend decreases and future profitability. 
They attribute this to the accounting concept of conservatism that “losses should be recognized in 
earnings when anticipated whereas profits should be recognized only when earned” (p.2126). Their 
findings were later opposed by Grullon et al. (2005) who argue that dividend changes are uncor-
related with future earnings and that only incorrectly specified models would result in misleading 
conclusions. They claim that Nissim and Ziv’s assumption of linearity in earnings expectations is 
inappropriate and the results obtained under this false assumption are biased. They further develop 
a model using the Fama and French (2000) modified partial adjustment model that assumes non-
linearity in earnings expectations and find no relation between dividend changes and future prof-
itability.   
Recent publications that adopt indirect approaches do find some evidence for dividend sig-
naling. Joos and Plesko (2004) re-examines the dividend signaling hypothesis for firms with neg-
ative cash flows where dividend increases are particularly costly. Their findings indicate that div-
idend increases have a greater predictive potential for firms with negative cash flows, as opposed 
to firms with positive cash flows. These findings are consistent with dividend signaling theory. 
Lee and Rui (2007), adopting time-series techniques, find that dividend changes do contain addi-
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tional information on firms’ future profitability. In his later papers, Lee (2010a and 2010b) inves-
tigates information content of dividend changes on future profits in Singapore and Australian mar-
kets respectively and finds evidence that supports the signaling effects of dividends.  
2.1.2 Other Dividend Theories 
Apart from the traditional dividend signaling theories, the free cash flow hypothesis and the ma-
turity hypothesis can explain firms’ dividend-paying behavior. Although they are not our focus, 
we give a brief account of their arguments in order to provide a relatively whole picture of different 
theories about dividend changes.  
The free cash flow hypothesis suggests that firms decrease dividends when free cash flow 
has fallen and increase dividends when free cash flow has risen, and the increase in free cash flow 
indicates a lack of investment opportunities (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Jensen, 1986). 
In this case, an increase in dividend serves no function in signaling firms’ profitability but rather 
it is a channel to dispense excess free cash so that less is available to be wasted on negative NPV 
projects (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). This suggests that divi-
dend policies can be used to address agency problems between corporate insiders and outside 
shareholders. As extra free cash may be diverted by insiders for self-interest purposes, outside 
shareholders may prefer dividend payments over retained earnings, to reduce excess free cash 
firms hold. In support of this, Lie (2000) finds that firms that increase dividends have more free 
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cash compared to industry counterparts. However, Yoon and Starks (1995) find no evidence that 
supports the free cash flow hypothesis after more variables are controlled.  
The maturity hypothesis (Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002) argues that dividend 
changes signal firms’ transitions in life cycles from a higher growth phase to a lower growth phase, 
or what they refer to as a mature phase. Specifically, firms increase dividends when investment 
opportunities decline as they become more mature. During the maturity process, an increase in 
excess cash and a decrease in systematic risk, return on assets, reinvestment rate, and growth rate 
can be observed. Grullon et al (2002) maintain that dividend increases are signs of firms’ matura-
tion process, and they are used as a channel to dispense excess cash that results from declining 
investment opportunities. They also find that profitability declines in the years following a divi-
dend increase.  
Both the cash flow hypothesis and the maturity hypothesis imply that firms allot extra free 
cash by increasing their dividend payments. There, however, exists a better channel to dispense 
excess free cash. Share repurchases, where a firm buys back its own shares from the market, are a 
more reasonable method to deal with the free cash problem. As dividends were taxed much heavier 
than capital gains and taxes on capital gains can be easily deferred, a significant tax advantage 
could be achieved by share repurchases compared to dividends payments. Dividend signaling mod-
els developed by Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) make no distinction between 
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dividends and share repurchases, which suggests share repurchases can be a substitute for divi-
dend.  
 Following Lintner (1956)’s model, Grullon and Michaely (2002) investigate the interac-
tion between dividends and share repurchases. They find that firms that pay dividends have been 
substituting dividends with share repurchases gradually, but they are not perfect substitutes as the 
rate of substitution does not equal one. Lee and Rui (2007) also find similar results by using time-
series techniques. These findings suggest that share repurchases cannot replace dividends. The 
reason might be dividends have more information content than repurchases. This is intuitively 
sound as dividend policy change is a long-term commitment whereas share purchase could just be 
a one-time event that only affects firms temporarily.  
A few other theories competing with signaling hypotheses besides the free cash flow and 
maturity hypotheses have also gained their grounds. The catering theory developed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004) state that the decisions on dividend payout policy are driven by investor demand. 
Their findings suggest that firms increase dividends when the demand for more dividends is high 
and decrease dividends when the demand is low. The theory was later tested by Ferris, Narayanan, 
and Sabherwal (2009) using international samples from 23 countries. They find evidence that sup-
ports dividend catering in firms which are incorporated in common law countries. However, for 
civil law firms, there is little evidence. Hoberg and Prabhala (2008) examine the disappearing 
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dividends phenomenon and find no catering effect once firm risk is controlled. They also argue 
that risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, explains a large portion of firms’ dividend paying behaviors. 
Except for the catering theory, earnings management is another competing theory in this area. As 
firms could manipulate their earnings to smooth income or to meet a predetermined target by ma-
neuvering cash from “cookie jar” accounts, earnings might not be as they appear.  Daniel, Denis, 
and Naveen (2008) find that firms manage earnings to meet dividend needs even when no cash 
flow consequences are involved. If firms pay dividends out of discretionary accruals which depend 
solely on management choices, dividend changes would have little information relating to future 
profitability.  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
In spite of other dividend hypotheses, we believe the classical dividend signaling theory that divi-
dend changes signal firms’ future profitability is still valid if the changes are made as a result of 
firms’ expected profitability updates. Therefore, we again propose the classical dividend signaling 
hypothesis: dividend change is positively associated with firm’s expected future profitability, often 
measured by changes in future earnings. The market, however, cannot always observe a persuasive 
future earnings increase (decrease) after a dividend increase (decrease). If the dividend signaling 
hypothesis is valid, then what could possibly go wrong? 
The signaling model developed by Lintner (1956) suggests that dividend payments depend 
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largely on stable and sustainable earnings and firms would change their dividend policy in re-
sponse to changes in the predictability of future earnings. Firms may increase their dividend only 
when they are confident that future increased earnings will be able to support not only the current 
rate of payment but also the additional portion; they may decrease their dividend when they are no 
longer confident that future earnings will support the current payment. The confidence of future 
earnings relies on not only the magnitude of expected earnings but also the volatility of these 
earnings. Bhattacharya (1979) proposes a similar effect that dividend changes are a function of 
expected cash flows and expected cash flow volatility. Furthermore, concentrating on dividend 
initiations, Dyl and Weigand (1998) argue that, “it is unlikely that managers will establish a regular 
payout policy until they have observed a permanent increase in both the level and stability of their 
firm’s earnings” (p.28). They also find that future earnings volatility decreases following dividend 
initiation announcements.  
By focusing on dividend omissions, Sant and Cowan (1994) suggest that managers would 
omit dividend payments when future earnings become more volatile and thus less predictable. 
Besides, they find that the volatility of future earnings increases after dividend omissions. They 
therefore argue that managers may omit dividends when there is an expected decline in earnings, 
or an expected increase in the variance of earnings increases, or both. Although these authors focus 
on dividend initiations and omissions, the same logic applies to dividend increases and decreases. 
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As a result, we propose that the current dividend change depends not only on the expected future 
earnings but also on the expected volatility of these earnings. For some firms, dividend changes 
signal not only future earnings but also earnings volatility.  
Consider the following example of two dividend-paying firms, Firm A and Firm B. Sup-
pose the two firms have exactly the same payout ratios (50%), current dividend per share ($0.5), 
current EPS ($1), and expected EPS in the next period ($2). The only difference between Firm A 
and Firm B is their expected earnings volatilities. Firm A has 50% probability of having zero 
earnings and another 50% probability of obtaining $4 per share in the following period, which 
makes its expected EPS $2. Firm B, on the other hand, has no uncertainty when it comes to future 
earnings. Its EPS is $2 (same as Firm A’s) with 100% probability. Now assume both firms tend to 
signal the market on future earnings by adjusting their dividend payments based on their payout 
ratios and expected earnings. If we neglect the difference in their expected earnings volatilities, it 
may appear that both firm A and firm B should increase their dividends from $0.5 to $1.  However, 
because Firm A has 50% probability of having zero earnings, it probably will postpone its dividend 
adjustment, in order to avoid readjustment if the less favorable scenario occurs, as Lintner (1956) 
suggests that firms may partially adjust their dividends to earnings, in order to shield them from 
future uncertainty.  
Now suppose for the period following the next, firm A’s EPS is expected to stay the same 
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at $2. However, this time, there is no uncertainty associated with it. Firm A will earn $2 per share 
with 100% probability. In other words, its earnings volatility is expected to reduce after the first 
period with no change in its expected earnings. Firm A will probably adjust its dividend from $0.5 
to $1 then, even though the expected earnings stay the same as the previous period. This example 
implies that two firms with same expected earnings can have different dividend policies if they 
have different expectations about the volatilities of future earnings. Firms might adjust their divi-
dend policy as a result of a change in expected earnings volatility rather than in expected earnings. 
As a result, earnings changes alone might not be sufficient enough to trigger dividend changes. It 
is the combination of expected earnings and expected earnings volatility that drives the changes in 
dividend. This could be why the previous empirical studies that only look at the direct relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings changes fail to find solid evidence to support the 
signaling hypothesis. When only future earnings changes are investigated, the dividend signaling 
hypothesis could appear insufficient in predicting firms’ future profitability.  
Suggested by Lintner (1956) and Bhattacharya (1979), firms with higher earnings volatility 
are more reluctant to increases dividends, ceteris paribus. For those firms, an increase in dividend 
could be resulted from a decrease in expected earnings volatility rather than an increase in future 
profitability levels. Consequently, we cannot observe future profits to increase after current divi-
dend increases, as the dividend increases are resulted from firms being comfortable with their 
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reduced future earnings volatility. On the other hand, for firms with low earnings volatility, divi-
dend increases would signal future profitability. In addition, a dividend decrease does not neces-
sarily indicate a decrease in future earnings. It is possible that the dividend decrease is a result of 
expected rise in future earnings volatility.  
To conclude, dividend changes can be resulted from an expected change in future earnings 
and/or an expected change in future earnings volatility. Firms would increase (decrease) their div-
idends if : (1) there is no change in expected earnings but a decrease (increase) in expected earnings 
volatility; (2) there is an increase (decrease) in expected earnings and no change in expected earn-
ings volatility; or (3) there is a combination of both changes in expected future earnings and future 
earnings volatility.  Expected earnings and expected earnings volatility interact with each other 
and they simultaneously influence dividend changes set by management. Reversely, the interaction 
suggests that the effect of dividend changes on predicting future profitability has been moderated 
or modified by expected volatilities.  
We use current earnings volatility levels as a surrogate to measure the interference effect 
of expected earnings volatility change on traditional dividend signals.1We think this bridge be-
tween current volatility levels and expected changes in earnings volatility is sound. For firms with 
                                                 
1 The perfect interaction term for our models would be expected changes in earnings volatility. Unfortunately, inside 
information such as management’s expectations on volatilities changes are nearly impossible to obtain. We could use 
realized future volatility changes as a proxy for expected volatilities. However, as we attempt to investigate whether 
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relatively low current earnings volatility, it is unlikely that those firms would increase dividends 
as a result of expected volatility reduction seeing their earnings volatility is already low; for firms 
with high volatility, it is fairly likely the case because high-volatility firms without an expected 
volatility reduction would be very reluctant to increase dividends and involve themselves into a 
long-term commitment of cash outflows.  
Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1a: Dividend increases are positively associated with firm’s future earnings changes, 
ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 1b: The positive association between dividend increases and future earnings changes 
is mitigated by higher current earnings volatility, ceteris paribus. 
As we have discussed, dividend changes do not necessarily signal future profitability alone. 
The dividend change policy may convey as much information about the risk of expected future 
earnings as it does about the magnitude of future earnings. Specially, for low-volatility firms, div-
idend increases should signal future earnings increases; however, for high-volatility firms, divi-
dend increases may not signal any change in earnings but signal future volatility reduction.  
Furthermore, we hypothesize the following addendums:  
                                                 
predictions on future earnings by analyzing published information is possible, using changes in future earnings vola-
tility would suffer from a look-ahead bias as the information on future volatility is unknown in the dividend event 
year. Instead, we use current earnings volatility levels as a surrogate. 
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Hypothesis 2a: For high-volatility firms, dividend increases signal lower future earnings volatil-
ity, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2b: For low-volatility firms, dividend increases signal higher future earnings, ceteris 
paribus. 
For dividend decreasing firms, we do not expect any solid finding because firms could 
reduce their dividends as a result of an increase in future earnings volatility regardless of current 
volatility levels. As a result, negative dividend changes can signal either lower future earnings or 
higher future earnings volatility in all cases. This could be the reason why previous studies failed 
to find any result regarding dividend decreases. Although we do not have a conclusive prediction 
for dividend decreases, following the literature we still include those observations in our tests.2  
3 Data and Methodology    
3.1 Data and Sample Selection3 
Using the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly event files, we identify dividend 
events of non-financial firms that trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) for at least two years during 
                                                 
2 In unreported regressions, we also test our models using only dividend increases and no-change events. The regres-
sion results are similar to those obtained when dividend decreases are included.  
3 We winsorize, throughout the paper, the dependent and independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the 
empirical distribution. We find similar results with trimming instead of winsorizing. 
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the period of 1975 to 2005 inclusive.4,5 We do not investigate the cases of dividend initiations and 
omissions as these extreme and sudden changes in payout policies have different links to future 
profitability compared to those of dividend increases or decreases. Events like special dividends, 
stock dividends, and stock repurchases are also not studied in this paper. We concentrate our re-
search on regular (quarterly) cash dividends (code No. 1232) which are of recurring commitment. 
To remain in the sample, a dividend event must further satisfy the following criteria:6 
1. The firm’s annual fundamentals are available on Compustat Monthly updates database;  
2. The firm paid four quarterly dividends in at least two consecutive years; 
3. No other distribution announcements were made between the declaration of the previous 
dividend and four days after the declaration of the current dividend; 
4. There were no ex-distribution dates between the ex-distribution dates of the previous and 
current dividends.  
                                                 
4 Due to quarterly data insufficiency and the rolling nature of earnings volatility, the earliest earnings volatility we can 
compute from Compustat database is in 1975. However, to verify our sample construction, we collect dividend change 
events from 1960-2013. In addition, we do not include the observations from the period of 2006-2013 (the global 
financial crisis and post crisis period) for the following reason. Dividend signals are supposed to signal expected 
changes. However, wide spread shocks disconnect actual earnings and volatility changes from expected ones, there-
fore distort the signaling effects. 
5 To be consistent with previous studies, only financial firms are eliminated from our sample (SIC 6000-6999). How-
ever, our results are robust when both financial firms and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded.  
6 We adopt the same sample selection criteria as those of Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005) so that our 
results are comparable to theirs.  
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Following Grullon et al. (2005), we calculate the annual dividend change RΔDivt of a specific 
fiscal year t as the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes ΔDivt,q.7 
                             RΔDivt= (1+ ΔDivt,1) (1+ ΔDivt,2) (1+ ΔDivt,3) (1+ ΔDivt,4)- 1                      (1) 
The resulting sample contains 36,742 firm-year observations: 1,307 dividend decreases, 
15,207 dividend increases, and 20,228 no-change observations. The difference in numbers suggest 
that firms are more reluctant to decrease their dividends as such change in dividend policy would 
be considered as a bad signal by investors, as what dividend signaling theory would suggest. Our 
data also show that average dividend increases (16.3%) are less significant in magnitude than av-
erage decreases (-39.8%). This is consistent with prior studies.  
3.2 Methodology8  
3.2.1 H1: Dividend Signaling and Earnings Volatility   
To establish a baseline and verify the validity of our sample construction, we first adopt two well-
acknowledged models in the literature which have different perspectives towards earnings expec-
tations: 1) the linear model proposed by Nissim and Ziv (2001) and 2) the nonlinear model pro-
posed by Grullon et al. (2005). For simplicity, we note them as base models. Our models which 
incorporate the effect of earnings volatility are termed modified models.  
                                                 
7 Quarterly dividend change ΔDivt,q is calculated as (Divt,q – Divt,q-1)/Divt,q-1 with Divt,0 equals Divt-1,4. 
8 Besides the explanation of variables in the text, a list of variable definitions is also provided in the appendix section. 
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Base Models 
As literature suggests that the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes are 
asymmetrical for dividend increases and decreases, Nissim and Ziv (2001) develop the following 
model to enable the separate estimations of the coefficients for dividend increases and decreases:  
Linear Model of Earnings Expectations 
         ∆E τ = β0 + β1P DPC0 × RΔDiv0 + β1N DNC0 × RΔDiv0 + β4 ROEτ-1+ β5 ∆E0 + ϵτ,                      (2) 
∆E τ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the dividend 
event year (year 0) deflated by the book value of equity at the beginning of announcement year 
(year -1). As management’s estimates of future earnings are not observable, actual future earnings 
are used as proxies for their estimates. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes one for dividend 
increases (decrease) and zero otherwise. RΔDiv0, as previously defined, is the annual dividend 
change of year τ. The linear model of earnings expectations includes return-on-equity ROEτ-1 as 
an independent variable to account for expected changes in earnings (mean reversion). It also con-
trols for previous earnings change ∆E0 to account for possible autocorrelation in earnings change 
series. We note that the above regression assumes that mean reversion and autocorrelation follow 
a linear pattern. From the regression equation (1), Nissim and Ziv (2001) find a positive and sig-
nificant β1P which suggests that there is a positive relation between dividend increases and future 
earnings increases.  
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However, Grullon et al. (2005) contend that Nissim and Ziv’s (2001) assumption of line-
arity in future earnings expectations is inappropriate. By adopting the modified partial adjusted 
model developed by Fama and French (2000), they propose the following model that controls for 
the nonlinearity in earnings expectations:  
Nonlinear Model of Earnings Expectations 
             ∆E τ = β0 + β1P DPC0 × RΔDiv0 + β1N DNC0 × RΔDiv0   
                                  + (γ1 + γ2 NDFED0 + γ3 NDFED0 × DFE0 + γ4 PDFED0 × DFE0) × DFE0 
                                  + (λ1 + λ2 NCED0 + λ3NCED0 × CE0 + λ4 PCED0 × CE0) × CE0 + ϵτ,                  (3)    
∆E τ, DPC (DNC), and RΔDiv0 are the same as those previously defined in the linear model.  Other 
variables in the model are proposed by Fama and French (2000) to capture the nonlinearities in 
earnings expectations and autocorrelation process. DFE0 denotes ROE0 – E[ROE0], where 
E[ROE0]is calculated as the fitted value from the annual cross-sectional regressions of ROE0 on 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in year -1, the nature logarithm of the market-
to-book ratio in year -1, and firms’ return-on-equity in year -1 relative to the dividend event year. 
NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy variable that takes one if DFE0 is negative (positive). CE0 is the 
earnings change in the dividend event year deflated by the book value of common equity in year -
1. NCED0 (PCED0) is a dummy variable that takes one if CE0 is negative (positive). The dummy 
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variables and squared terms are an attempt to reflect the nonlinearity in mean reversion and auto-
correlation in earnings, as explained in Fama and French (2000). To be more specific, these vari-
ables are designed, “to capture the fact that large changes in earnings revert faster than small 
changes and negative changes revert faster than positive changes (Grullon et al., 2005, p.1667)”. 
From equation (2), Grullon et al. (2005) find no evidence that would support the traditional divi-
dend signaling hypothesis. The positive relation found in the linear model between dividend in-
creases and future earnings changes disappears in the nonlinear model.   
Modified Models  
To test whether firms’ earnings volatility affects dividend signaling, we introduce industry-
adjusted earnings volatility to be an interaction between dividend changes and earnings changes. 
Following Dichev and Tang (2008), earnings volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of 
quarterly earnings before extraordinary items on the book value of total assets over a five-year 
rolling period. That is, for example, our measure for earnings volatility of a firm for the year 2000 
is the standard deviations of quarterly earnings before extraordinary items on the book value of 
total assets over the 20 quarterly observations between 1996 and 2000. We adjust them to their 
particular industries by calculating the ratio of earnings volatilities to industry averages based on 
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2-digit SIC code. We thus propose our starter model that incorporates earnings volatilities: 9  
                                 ∆E τ = α0 + α1 RΔDiv0 + α2 EV0 + α12 RΔDiv0 × EV0 + ϵτ                                           (4) 
EV0 is the industry-adjusted earnings volatility. Other variables are the same as defined earlier.  
We then enhance our model based on the two base models discussed in section 4.2.1, 
namely the linear model and the nonlinear model.  We include both models in order to be prudent 
with the inclusion of earnings volatility and its effects on the relation between dividend changes 
and earnings changes. To account for the asymmetric reactions of earnings changes for dividend 
increases and decreases, we also allow for the separation of coefficients for positive and negative 
dividend changes. Our modified models are presented below. All variables are the same as previ-
ously defined.  
Modified Linear Model of Earnings Expectations  
                 ∆E τ = β0 + DPC0 (β1P RΔDiv0 + β2P EV0 + β3P RΔDiv0 × EV0) 
                         + DNC0 (β1N RΔDiv0 + β2N EV0 + β3N RΔDiv0 × EV0) 
                                      +β4ROEτ-1+ β5 ∆E0 + ϵτ,                                                                                                                                  (5) 
 
                                                 
9 There might be a concern of having current earnings volatility as an independent variable when the dependent vari-
able is future earnings changes, since a historically highly volatile firm might have high future earnings changes re-
gardless of dividend changes.  To address this concern, we calculate the correlations between the absolute values of 
future earnings changes and current earnings volatility. For the two years following dividend changes, the correlations 
are 0.31 and 0.19, which are not highly correlated. 
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Modified Nonlinear Model of Earnings Expectations  
                ∆E τ = β0 + DPC0 (β1P RΔDiv0 + β2P EV0 + β3P RΔDiv0 × EV0) 
                       + DNC0 (β1N RΔDiv0 + β2N EV0 + β3N RΔDiv0 × EV0) 
                                   + (γ1 + γ2 NDFED0 + γ3 NDFED0 × DFE0 + γ4 PDFED0 × DFE0) × DFE0 
                                   + (λ1+ λ2 NCED0 + λ3NCED0 × CE0 + λ4 PCED0 × CE0) × CE0 + ϵτ,                  (6)    
In both equation (5) and (6), we expect β1P to be positive and β3P to be negative. A positive 
β1P value indicates that dividend increases are positively associated with earnings changes, while 
a negative β3P value shows that the positive relation is mitigated by earnings volatility. For divi-
dend decreases, we do not have strong expectations regarding the signs of the coefficients.  
In order to verify that Nissim and Ziv’s (2001) and Grullon et al.’s (2005) results still hold 
in our sample and to make our results comparable to theirs, we first test all four models by using 
the two-stage procedure proposed by Fama-MacBeth (1973) which is adopted by both of the two 
mentioned studies. To apply Fama-MacBeth two-stage procedure, we estimate the coefficients 
using annual cross-sectional regressions. We then calculate the mean coefficients of the cross-
sectional regressions and compute the test statistics respectively. Designed to address time effects, 
the Fama-MacBeth procedure is unbiased with the presence of an “unobserved time effect”; it is, 
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however, biased when an “unobserved firm effect” exists (Petersen, 2009).10 Therefore, apart from 
Fama-MacBeth’s two-stage procedure, we also use Rogers standard errors clustered by firms to 
account for the residual dependence generated by firm effects and control possible time effects by 
including year dummies.  
3.2.2 H2: Dividend Signaling for High/Low-Volatility Firms  
To test the signaling effect of dividend changes on future earnings changes for high/low-volatility 
firms, we modify models (5) and (6) and replace earnings volatility EV0 with a high-volatility 
dummy (DHEV0) or a low-volatility dummy (DLEV0). DHEV0 (DLEV0) is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if a firm’s current volatility level belongs to the top (bottom) 25% of the entire sample 
volatilities.11 To be cautious, we test both linear and nonlinear models.  
To investigate the behavior of future earnings volatilities following dividend changes in 
high/low-volatility firms, we examine the changes in earnings volatility, pre- and post- dividend. 
                                                 
10 According to Petersen (2009), an unobserved firm effect occurs when “the residuals of a given firm may be corre-
lated across years (time series dependence)” and a time effect occurs when “the residuals of a given year may be 
correlated cross different firms (cross-sectional dependence)”.  
11 We could also define DHEV0 (DLEV0) as a dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm’s current volatility level belongs 
to the top (bottom) 25% of the sample in its specific year. The regression results are fairly consistent with those when 
DHEV0 (DLEV0) are defined as what is stated in the text. However, as there are some years with generally low vola-
tilities for most firms, even a 0.7 volatility (lower than industry average) would be considered as a high volatility (top 
25%) if we adopt this alternative measure. As a results, we define DHEV0 (DLEV0) as a dummy variable that takes 1 
if a firm’s current volatility level belongs to the top (bottom) 25% of the entire sample volatilities. 
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We therefore test the following model: 12 
∆EV5= β0 + DPC0 (β1P RΔDiv0 + β2PDHEV0 + β3P RΔDiv0 × DHEV0) 
                + DNC0 (β1N RΔDiv0 + β2N DHEV0 + β3N RΔDiv0 × DHEV0)  
                + φ1EV0 + φ2MB-1 + φ3 SIZE-1 + φ4 LEV-1 + ϵτ,                                               (7) 
∆EV5 is the five year change in adjusted earnings volatility following the dividend event.13 It is 
calculated as EV5 - EV0, where EVτ  is the industry-adjusted earnings volatility in the τ
th year fol-
lowing the dividend event. We include current earnings volatility EV0 to control for the inter-
temporal persistence of earnings volatility. Following Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) 
and Pastor and Veronesi (2003), we also include several variables of firm characteristics to control 
for the expected volatility change. We control for firms’ performance and growth stage, measured 
by MB-1. We expect its coefficient to be positive as future earnings of growth firms are expected 
to have more volatile earnings. We include firm size SIZE-1 in the model. Since large firms are 
normally more stable than small firms in terms of future earnings, we expect its coefficient to be 
negative. We also control for leverage LEV-1, defined as the ratio of total long term debt to book 
value of total assets. We expect the coefficient for LEV-1 to be negative as higher leverage restrains 
firms from taking more risky projects and thus lead to more stable future earnings. Other variables 
                                                 
12 We replace DHEV0 with DLEV0 for the model that investigates low volatility firms.  
13 As an alternative, we also test three-year changes in adjusted earnings volatility, ∆EV3 (calculated as EV3 - EV0). 
The findings are consistent as those of the five year change.  
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are the same as previously defined.  
4 Empirical Results  
4.1 Summary Statistics and Sample Verification  
We present the summary statistics of major dependent and independent variables in Table I. From 
the table, we see that for firms that increase their dividends, the average changes in earnings are 
1.0% and 1.3% for each of the two years following dividend event years. Firms that have no change 
in policy show earnings changes of 0.7% and 1.0%, which are smaller than firms that increase 
their dividends. For firms that have negative dividend changes, their earnings on average grow at 
2.4% and 1.5% following the dividend event. This result contradicts the predictions of the tradi-
tional dividend signaling theory as negative dividend changes are supposed to signal unfavorable 
future prospects. Additionally, the average earnings volatility for dividend increasing firms is 
0.858, whereas it is 1.234 and 1.062 for dividend decreasing firms and no-change firms respec-
tively. This result implies that firms with negative dividend changes have the most volatile earn-
ings, while firms with positive dividend changes have the smallest earnings volatility. The average 
five-year changes in adjusted earnings volatility following a dividend change event for the three 
groups are 0.128 (increase), -0.120 (decreases) and 0.088 (no-change), which indicates that future 
earnings volatility of firms which have positive or zero dividend changes increases on average, 
while that of dividend decreasing firms decreases. It should be noted that the average earnings 
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volatility for dividend increasing firms is still lower than the industry average after the five year 
increase.  
[Insert TABLE I here] 
Table II illustrates the differences in average earnings changes in the first and second years 
following positive dividend changes and also the differences in average earnings volatility changes 
during the five years following dividend increases and decreases. We create 16 portfolios for div-
idend increases based on four quartiles of current earnings volatility and four quartiles of dividend 
increases. Similarly, for dividend decreases, we create 9 portfolios.14  
[Insert TABLE II here] 
We see from Table II Panel I-A that in firms with low current earnings volatility (EV1), as 
positive dividend changes increase from small scale (PC1) to large scale (PC4), the average earn-
ings change in the first year after the event increases monotonically. The difference in the average 
first year earnings change between small dividend changes and large dividend changes is signifi-
cantly different from zero. No such pattern can be observed for other volatility levels. This implies 
that for firms with low current volatility, higher dividend increases indicate higher future earnings 
changes in the first year following dividend change events. Panel I-B of Table II shows the average 
earnings change in the second year following the dividend changes. It can be seen that for firms 
                                                 
14 Here we combine the first two quartiles of dividend decreases because more than 25% dividend decreases are -0.5. 
Pleas also note that DC12 indicates large-scale dividend decreases while DC4 is for small-scale decreases.   
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with high current earnings volatility (EV4), a higher dividend increase does not necessarily signal 
a higher average future earnings change in year 2, which contradicts what the traditional dividend 
signaling theory would predict. From Panel I-C, we can see that for firms with high current vola-
tility (EV4), the average future earnings volatility decreases as firms pay higher dividends. Besides, 
regardless of the level of dividend increases, average earnings volatility decreases for firms with 
high current volatility following positive dividend events. These findings are in line with our hy-
potheses.  
Table II Panel II-A shows the average first year earnings changes for dividend decreases. 
From Panel II-A shows that for high volatility firms (EV4) the average year 1 earnings changes 
increase as firms cut more dividend payments (from NC4 to NC12). This contradicts with what 
we expect. For firms with relatively high dividend cuts (NC12), the higher the current volatility 
the higher the first year earnings. We cannot observe anything significant in Panel II-B. However, 
Panel II-C shows that for firms with higher current volatility, dividend decreases are associated 
with future volatility reductions. This finding is also different from our expectations.  
To verify our sample construction, we first run the base models using the same time period 
(1963-1997) and same procedural method (Fama-Macbeth) as Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon 
et al. (2005)’s. We also extend their sample period to 2005 to test whether their results would be 
affected by the change of time period. In unreported regressions, we find consistent results as those 
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of Nissim and Ziv (2001)’s and Grullon et al. (2005)’s. To summarize, regression results of linear 
base models suggest that dividend increases are positively associated with future profitability in 
both the first and second years following the dividend event year. All of the coefficients are sig-
nificantly different from zero at conventional confidence levels. However, no significant positive 
or negative relationship between dividend decreases and future prospects is found. These findings 
are consistent despite of different sampling periods. However, under the nonlinear models, we 
cannot find any relation between dividend changes and future profitability, implying that dividend 
changes do not signal firms’ prospects. The nonlinear model generally explains a larger fraction 
of cross-sectional variations than the linear model, which suggests the assumption of the nonline-
arity in earnings expectations might be more accurate than the linear one. The consistency in the 
regression results proves the validity of our sample construction. 
4.2 H1: Dividend Signaling and Earnings Volatility   
We first test our regression models by using the two-stage procedure proposed by Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) which is adopted by both of the previous studies. We test both the linear models and the 
nonlinear models with and without considering earnings volatility. To be consistent with the liter-
ature, we examine the association between dividend changes and the changes in earnings in each 
of the two years following the dividend change.  
Table III shows the regression results of future earnings changes on dividend changes from 
34 
 
the linear models using Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure. To better observe the effect of earnings 
volatility on the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes, we present both the 
results of base model (Column I) and those of the modified model (Colum II). 
[Insert TABLE III here] 
Column I of Table III shows that, under the base model, the coefficients for dividend in-
creases are positive and significant for both year 1 and 2. The coefficients are equal to 0.039 and 
0.041 when τ =1 and 2 respectively, implying a positive association between dividend increases 
and future earnings changes. However, no such conclusion can be reached for dividend decreases. 
From the modified models (Column II), we find the coefficients for dividend increases are 0.077 
and 0.070 for the two year horizon, which are larger than those of the base model. The interaction 
between positive dividend changes and earnings volatility, which test the effect of earnings vola-
tility on dividend signaling is expected to have a negative coefficient. Consistent with our expec-
tation, the coefficients are -0.052 and -0.069 for both horizons. Both coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. In addition, the coefficients for earnings volatility levels are also positive and 
significant, implying a positive relation between volatility and future earnings changes. However, 
the coefficients for volatility levels are approximately 0.01, which are much smaller than those for 
dividend increases and the interaction term. This indicates that positive dividend changes are the 
main drive for future earnings increases and that the interaction between dividends increases and 
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expected volatility levels play a significant role in the overall signaling effect. For dividend de-
creases, although the coefficients for dividend changes are insignificant for both years, the inter-
action between dividend decreases and earnings volatility is 0.156, which is significantly different 
from zero.  
Furthermore, it is also found that return-on-equity ROEτ-1 is negatively related to earnings 
changes. This is more or less expected as ROEτ-1 is documented to be mean- reverting (Freeman, 
Ohlson, and Penman, 1982). A high ROE indicates an expected earnings decrease, while a low 
ROE indicates an expected earnings increases. The negative coefficient for previous earnings 
change ∆E0 implies a negative autocorrelation in earnings change series. In addition, the modified 
model has a larger R2 than the base model. This again shows that the inclusion of earnings volatility 
largely improves the base model and its power to capture the relation between dividend changes 
and earnings changes.  
Table IV reports the results based on the nonlinear models using Fama-MacBeth procedure. 
The results of the base model (Column I) show no relation between dividend changes and earnings 
changes. All the coefficients associated with dividend increases and decreases are insignificant, 
suggesting that no information content can be found in dividend change announcements regarding 
to future earnings. However, the results change drastically once earning volatility is considered.  
[Insert TABLE IV here] 
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Under the modified model (Column II), we observe a positive relation between dividend 
increases and earnings changes for the first year following the dividend event year with a coeffi-
cient for dividend increases that equals to 0.068. We should note that this relationship cannot be 
found by the base model that neglects the effect of earnings volatility on dividend signaling. More-
over, the coefficient for the interaction between dividend increases and earnings volatility for year 
1 is -0.053, which is significantly different from zero. The negative coefficient implies that earn-
ings volatility negatively affects the relation between dividend increases and future earnings 
changes. Consequently, the inclusion of earnings volatility is not only necessary but also mean-
ingful. For the second year following the dividend increase year, however, the coefficients for 
dividend increases and the interaction term are insignificant, suggesting that dividend increases 
convey little information regarding profitability in year 2. In addition, no evidence of dividend 
signaling is found for dividend decreases for the first year. For the second year following the div-
idend decrease year, there seems to be a positive relation between the interaction term and earnings 
changes, which is similar to what we find with the modified linear model. The minor relation 
between earnings volatility levels and future earnings changes can also be found for both year 1 
and year 2. Moreover, the modified model improves the average adjusted R2 from 11.6% to 14.3% 
for the first year following the dividend change year.  
After having tested our models by using Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure, we now rerun 
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all the above regressions using Rogers standard errors clustered by firms to control fixed firm 
effects. We also use year dummies as a control for possible time effects. In Table V, we present 
the regression estimates of future earnings changes on dividend changes based on the linear model. 
The results for dividend increases are consistent with those that are found when we use the Fama-
MacBeth procedure. For the base model, the coefficients for positive dividend changes are positive 
and significantly different from zero, which supports the traditional dividend signaling theory. In 
particular, the coefficients for dividend increases are 0.042 and 0.028 for the two years following 
the dividend event year. However, a significant negative relationship is shown between dividend 
decreases and the first year earnings change. This indicates that, contradicting with what the sig-
naling theory would predict, firms that decrease dividend in year 0 show significant earnings in-
creases in year 1. Benartzi et al. (1997) also find similar results for earnings decreases. For the 
second year, however, a significant positive relation between dividend decreases and earnings 
changes can be found, which is consistent with the traditional dividend signaling hypothesis.  
[Insert TABLE V here] 
Column II presents the estimates after we include the effect of earnings volatility on divi-
dend signaling. The regression results are very similar to those obtained from the Fama-MacBeth 
Procedure. The coefficients for positive dividend increases are 0.065 and 0.053 for the first and 
second year following the dividend change. Both of them are positive and significant, indicating 
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that the positive relationship between dividend increases and futures earnings increases does exist.  
However, that relation is negatively affected by current earnings volatility levels, as seen from the 
negative coefficients for the interaction between dividend increases and earnings volatility. Fur-
thermore, current volatility levels seem to have slight but positive effects on future earnings 
changes as well. The coefficients for dividend decreases are 0.035 and 0.013 for the two years 
following dividend changes. Although the second year coefficient is insignificant, the results are 
generally consistent with what dividend signaling predicts. The interaction between dividend de-
creases and earnings volatility is positive and significant for the second year following dividend 
change events, suggesting the association between dividend decreases and year 2 earnings is pos-
itively affected by earnings volatility levels. In addition, the modified model has a larger R2 and 
larger coefficients for dividend increases than the base model. This again shows that the inclusion 
of earnings volatility largely improves the base model and its power to capture the relation between 
dividend changes and earnings changes.  
Table VI shows the regression results of future earnings changes on dividend changes 
based on nonlinear models. For the base model (Column I), unlike the results obtained from the 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure, the coefficient for dividend increases by using clustered stand-
ard errors is positive and significant for the first year following the dividend event year, suggesting 
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a positive association between dividend increases and earnings changes. This implies that the re-
sults of the nonlinear models might change once unobserved firm effects are controlled.  The re-
gression results, however, show no relation between dividend decreases and earnings changes. 
[Insert TABLE VI here] 
Column II shows the regression estimates of the modified model. Similar to the results 
obtained from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure, we find a significant relation between divi-
dend increases and first-year earnings changes. The coefficient for dividend increases is 0.055. 
This relationship is subject to earnings volatility, which can be seen from the negative and signif-
icant coefficient for the interaction between dividend increases and earnings volatility. For the 
second year following dividend increases, the direct relation between changes in dividends and 
changes in earnings disappears. The interaction, however, still plays some role in predicting future 
earnings. The minor relation between earnings volatility levels and future earnings changes can 
also be found for both year 1 and year 2. No evidence of dividend signaling is found for dividend 
decreases.  Like the modified linear model, the modified nonlinear model improves the adjusted 
R2 from 8.9% to 10.5% in the first year following the dividend change year.  
To conclude, The Fama-MacBeth procedure and the clustered standard errors produce very 
similar results regarding the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes. Our findings 
from the base models are consistent with those of Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005). 
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Under the linear model by Nissim and Ziv (2001), the signaling effect of dividend increases on 
firms’ future earnings changes can be found. Consistent with Grullon et al. (2005), the relation no 
longer exists under the non-linear model. However, after we include earnings volatility as an in-
teraction between dividend changes and earnings changes, we find evidence that supports the ex-
istence of not only the signaling effect of dividend increases on earnings changes but also the 
interaction effect of earnings volatility on dividend signaling for both years under the linear model 
and for the first year under the nonlinear model. The results support our hypotheses H1a and H1b 
for the first year following the dividend event year regardless of which earnings expectations is 
used, linear or nonlinear. These findings add new evidence to the traditional dividend signaling 
theory and show the importance of the recognition of earnings volatility and its role in dividend 
signaling. Besides, the modified model significantly improves the explanation power and gener-
ates larger coefficients for dividend increases.  
4.3 H2: Dividend Signaling for High/Low-Volatility Firms 
Change in Future Earnings  
Hypothesis 2 attempts to test the effects of dividend signaling specifically for high and low 
volatility firms. We investigate changes in earnings and changes in earnings volatility following 
dividend event changes.  
Table VII presents the regression results of the linear models to help evaluate the signals 
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of dividend changes on future earnings for high and low volatility firms. Column I of Table VII 
shows the regression results in the presence of high earnings volatility; whereas Column II shows 
those in the presence of low volatility. Consistent with previous findings, the coefficients for div-
idend increases are positive in both high and low-volatility firms. Even though the coefficient for 
dividend increases is not significant for the second year in low-volatility firms, the findings are 
generally consistent with the traditional dividend signaling theory that there is a positive associa-
tion between dividend increases and future earnings changes. However, the interaction between 
dividend changes and high volatility has a significantly negative coefficient with a value of -0.046. 
The sum of the coefficients of dividend increases and the interaction term for the first year is 0.007. 
We test the sum of the two coefficients using an F test and find that it is not significantly different 
from zero. This implies that dividend increases do not effectively signal first year future earnings 
changes for high-volatility firms. Besides, the sum of the two coefficients for the second year is -
0.044, which is significantly different from zero under an F test. This contradicts the traditional 
signaling hypothesis.  
[Insert TABLE VII here] 
For low-volatility firms, dividend increases signal first year future earnings changes as the 
coefficient for the interaction between dividend changes and low volatility is insignificant. How-
ever, no similar conclusion can be reached for negative dividend changes. Our findings do not 
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change even if we include both high-volatility dummy and low-volatility dummy in the same 
model. The regression results are presented in Column III. Similar to previous findings, we find 
positive coefficients for dividend increases and negative coefficients for the interaction between 
dividend increases and high volatility for the first year following dividend change events. The sum 
of the two is tested to be insignificant, implying that a dividend increase does not signal an increase 
in earnings for high-volatility firms. For low-volatility firms, dividend increases do have some 
information content regarding future earnings, suggested by the insignificant coefficient for the 
interaction term.  
Table VIII shows the regression estimates of modified nonlinear models. We cannot find 
evidence of dividend signaling on future earnings for the second year following dividend event 
year. However, the findings are similar to those of the linear models for the first year. We note 
that, for nonlinear models, the sum of coefficients for dividend increases and the interaction is 
negative in high-volatility firms for the first year. We test the sum of the coefficients using an F 
test and we find that the sum is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that there is 
no relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes in the presence of high earnings 
volatility. For firms with low current volatility, the coefficient for the interaction between dividend 
increases and earnings volatility is insignificant. Yet, no result can be found for dividend decreases.  
[Insert TABLE VIII here] 
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To conclude, for positive dividend changes, our findings are consistent with our expecta-
tion that traditional dividend signaling amplifies in low-volatility firms and diminishes in high-
volatility firms. For negative dividend changes, no conclusion can be reached. 
Change in Future Earnings Volatility  
In Table IX, we present the regression results of future volatility changes on dividend 
changes for high and low volatility firms respectively. Column I shows the regression results of 
five-year changes in earnings volatility in the presence of high earnings volatility; whereas Column 
II shows those in the presence of low volatility. In general, dividend increases are negatively as-
sociated with future volatility changes as the coefficients for dividend increases are -0.354 and -
0.328 for both high volatility and low volatility models. However, for high-volatility firms, the 
effect is much stronger, as suggested by the negative coefficient for the interaction between divi-
dend increases and high volatility dummy that takes on the value -0.562. The total effect of divi-
dend increases on earnings volatility changes for high-volatility firms is the sum of the two coef-
ficients, which is -0.916. It is significantly different from zero under an F test. This finding sug-
gests that dividend increases signal lower future volatility in high-volatility firms.  
For low-volatility firms, the coefficient for the interaction between dividend increases and 
low volatility dummy, although insignificant, is positive. We test the sum of coefficients for the 
interaction and dividend increases and find that the sum is not significantly different from zero, 
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implying that dividend increases do not signal future earnings volatility reduction for low volatility 
firms. For dividend decreases, there seems to be a positive association between dividend changes 
and future earnings volatility changes. However, for low-volatility firms, this effect is eliminated 
by the negative coefficient for the interaction between dividend decreases and low volatility 
dummy. The coefficient is -1.349, resulting a total effect of dividend decreases on earnings vola-
tility changes equals to -0.994. This effect is significantly different from zero under an F test. In 
other words, in low-volatility firms, the larger the decrease in dividend, the larger the increase in 
earnings volatility. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients for MB-1, SIZE-1, and LEV-1 are the 
same as previously expected. In sum, in high-volatility firms, dividend increases signal a reduction 
in earnings volatility rather than an increase in future earnings, which is consistent with our hy-
potheses. Interestingly, in low-volatility firms, dividend decreases mainly signal future increase in 
earnings volatility.  
[Insert TABLE IX here] 
We also test a similar model in which both high-volatility dummy and low-volatility 
dummy are controlled in the same regression, shown in Colum III of Table IX. The results regard-
ing dividend increases are consistent as those of the previous regression. We find a negative coef-
ficient (-0.313) for dividend increases, which suggests a negative association between dividend 
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increases and future volatility changes. This negative association is much stronger for high-vola-
tility firms, as can be seen by the negative coefficient for the interaction between dividend in-
creases and high volatility dummy that takes -0.607. The combined effect of dividend increases on 
earnings volatility changes for high-volatility firms is -0.92, which is tested to be significantly 
different from zero. For low volatility firms, there is no additional effect on volatility changes from 
dividend increases. For dividend decreases, a positive association between dividend changes and 
future earnings volatility changes can be found. It also shows that in low-volatility firms the larger 
the decrease in dividend, the larger the earning volatility would increase.  
Except for the five-year changes, we furthermore test three-year changes in earnings vola-
tility as an alternative. Column IV of Table IX shows the regression results when both high-vola-
tility dummy and low-volatility dummy are included. Even though the coefficient for dividend 
increases is not significant, the coefficient for the interaction between dividend increases and high-
volatility is negative and significant. The combined coefficient of the two is also tested to be neg-
ative and significant, suggesting that for high-volatility firms there is a negative association be-
tween dividend increases and future earnings volatility changes. This finding is consistent with 
that of the five-year changes. Moreover, the regression results also suggest that for low-volatility 
firms, the bigger the dividend decrease is, the higher the three-year future earnings volatility would 
be.  This result cannot be found with the five year change.  
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5 Robustness Tests 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we first repeat our analyses using alternative measures 
of earnings changes and dividend changes and/or include additional control variables, and test 
whether our results are subject to the above changes: 1) we redefine dividend changes by deflating 
quarterly dividend changes by stock prices instead of scaling by previous dividend payment; 2) we 
recalculate earnings changes as the difference in earnings divided by book value of assets rather 
than book value of common equities; 3) in model (7), we control for firm age, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the number years since the firm appears on CRSP, as another variable to account for 
the uncertainty embedded in firms’ operation . We find that in all of these cases, our findings are 
similar to what we have obtained.  
As earnings change is not the only indicator for firms’ future prospects, to examine the 
relation between dividend changes and firms’ future profitability, both Nissim and Ziv (2001) and 
Grullon et al. (2005) also use other proxies as alternative measures for future profitability. Using 
both the linear and nonlinear models, Grullon et al. (2005) find that dividend increases and de-
creases are negatively related to ROA changes in the year following the dividend event year, which 
is inconsistent with what the dividend signaling theory predicts. In addition, using a linear model, 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) find that dividend changes, specifically dividend increases, are positively 
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associated with future earnings levels. However, Grullon et al. (2005) argue that this relation dis-
appears after controlling for nonlinearities. For robustness, we also use ROA changes and earnings 
levels as additional proxies for firms’ future profitability and test their relations with dividend 
changes. We believe, as it is for earnings changes, there is a positive relationship between dividend 
changes and ROA changes or earnings levels. This relation, however, is subject to the level of 
firms’ current earnings volatility.  
5.1 Dividend Changes and ROA Changes  
Grullon et al. (2005) defines ROA as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book 
value of total assets (oibdp/at). To ensure our results are comparable to theirs, we first use the same 
definition of ROA. We also estimate the four models using ROA defined as the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets (ib/at), which is a more common defi-
nition of ROA. We replace earning changes ∆Eτ in models (2), (3), (5), and (6) with ∆ROAτ (cal-
culated as ROAτ - ROAτ-1) as the dependent variable. The linear and nonlinear control variables 
are also adjusted accordingly.15 Table X presents the coefficient estimates from the regressions of 
changes in ROA (defined as oibdp/at or ib/at) on dividend changes based on linear models.  
                                                 
15 In the linear models, the control variables are ROAτ-1 and ∆ROA τ. In the nonlinear models, DFE0 is ROA0 – 
E[ROA0], where E[ROA0] is the fitted value from the annual cross-sectional regressions of ROA0 on the logarithm of 
the book value of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1 and ROA-1. NDFED0 
(PDFED0) takes one if DFE0 is negative (positive) and zero otherwise. CE0 is ROA0 – ROA-1. NCED0 (PCED0) takes 
one if CE0 is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. 
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[Insert TABLE X here] 
Consistent with Grullon et al. (2005), under base model (Panel A Column I), we find no 
significant relationship between positive dividend changes and ROA (oibdp/at) changes for either 
year. Besides, the coefficient for dividend decreases is negative for the first year, which contradicts 
the signaling theory. We modify the base models by including earnings volatility. Column II of 
Table X reports the regression results from the modified linear model. Unlike what we find in the 
base model, the coefficients for positive dividend changes become positive and significant for both 
years, suggesting a positive relation between dividend increases and future ROA changes. Besides, 
the coefficients for interaction terms are -0.010 and -0.021 for both horizons, which are negative 
and significantly different from zero as what we would expect. These results show that once earn-
ings volatility is controlled, the relation between dividend increases and ROA changes would ap-
pear. However, no such conclusion can be prudently reached for dividend decreases.  
Additionally, if we define ROA as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the 
book value of total assets, the results would vary. Panel B of Table X shows the coefficient esti-
mates from the regression of changes in ROA (defined as ib/at) on dividend changes based on 
linear models. From Column I of Panel B, we can see that the coefficients for dividend increases 
are positive and significant for both years, indicating a positive relation between dividend increases 
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and ROA changes. For the modified model, the relation is even stronger, with significant coeffi-
cients of 0.021 and 0.022 for the first and second years following dividend event year. The coeffi-
cients for the interaction terms are -0.015 and -0.023 for the two years respectively, suggesting the 
existence of a mitigating effect of earnings volatility on dividend signaling 
Table XI shows the results when nonlinear models are used. Under base model (Panel A 
Column I), negative relationship between dividend increases and ROA (oibdp/at) changes for both 
years following the dividend change event can be seen. The coefficients are -0.008 and -0.010 for 
year 1 and year 2. This shows that an increase in dividends indicates a decrease in future ROA, 
which is contradictory to what dividend signaling theory would predict. The coefficients for divi-
dend decreases also have wrong signs. Under the base model, it seems that dividend changes are 
negatively associated with ROA changes. For the modified model (Panel A Column II), the sig-
nificant negative relationship between dividend changes and ROA changes that was found from 
the base model disappears. Moreover, though insignificant, the coefficients for positive divided 
changes become positive for both horizons. No significant relation, either positive or negative, can 
be found between negative dividend changes and ROA changes. Panel B reports the results of 
nonlinear models when ROA is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the 
book value of total assets (ib/at). We find no significant result for negative dividend changes for 
both base and modified models. However, a negative significant relation can be found between 
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dividend changes and second year ROA changes. This contradicts with the traditional dividend 
signaling hypothesis. However, this negative relation does not exist when earnings volatility is 
controlled. Furthermore, a positive relation between dividend increases and first year ROA 
changes can be found under modified model. The mitigating effect of earnings volatility can also 
be seen from the negative coefficient for the interaction.    
[Insert TABLE XI here] 
To summarize, under the base models, we find that changes in future ROA, defined as the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of total assets, are not positively 
correlated with past dividend changes. In fact, it seems that there is a negative relationship between 
changes in dividends and changes in future ROAs, which is contrary to the traditional dividend 
signaling theory. However, once we control for earnings volatility, the results change dramatically. 
Under the modified linear model, we find a positive relation between dividend increases and ROA 
changes in both year 1 and year 2. For the modified nonlinear model, even though no certain con-
clusion regarding signaling can be reached, the negative relation between dividend changes and 
ROA changes, as observed from the base model, disappears. Moreover, if ROA is defined as the 
ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets, the signaling effect 
between dividend increases and first-year ROA can be detected under the nonlinear model. 
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5.2 Dividend Changes and Earnings Levels  
In both Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005), authors also examine the relationship 
between dividend changes and future earnings levels. However, using models of different earnings 
expectations, they end up with very different results. Following Grullon et al. (2005), we define 
earnings levels as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by book values of total equity. We 
replace the earning changes ∆Eτ in models (2), (3), (5) and (6) with ROE τ as the dependent varia-
ble. The linear and nonlinear control variables are also adjusted accordingly.16 Following Nissim 
and Ziv (2001) and Grullon et al. (2005), we also control for firm size (SIZE-1) and market-to-
book ratio (MB-1) for both linear and nonlinear models.
17 We first replicate their analyses. Then 
we test our hypothesis using the modified models which consider firms’ earnings volatility levels.  
In Table XII, we present the regression estimates from the linear models. Consistent with 
the findings of Nissim and Ziv (2001), from the base model, a significant positive relation can be 
found between dividend increases and future earnings levels. From the modified model, the posi-
tive relation between dividend increases and future earnings levels can also be found with the 
                                                 
16 In the linear models, the adjusted control variables are ROEτ-1 and ROE0 – ROE -1. In the nonlinear models, DFE0 
is replaced by ROEτ, which is earnings before extraordinary items in year τ deflated by the book value of equity in 
year τ. NDFED0 (PDFED0) takes one if ROE0 is negative (positive) and zero otherwise. CE0 is equal to ROE0 – 
ROE -1. NCED0 (PCED0) takes one if CE0 is negative (positive) and zero otherwise. 
17 Definitions of SIZE-1 and MB-1 can be found in the appendix.  
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coefficients being 0.041 and 0.028. Furthermore, the interaction effect can be observed as the co-
efficients for the interaction between earnings volatility and dividend increases are negative and 
significant. The coefficients for the interaction terms are -0.029 and -0.043 for the two years. The 
minor influence of earnings volatility on future earnings levels can be seen as well for positive 
dividend changes. However, no significant result can be evidenced for negative dividend changes. 
The findings suggest that dividend increases are positively associated with future earnings levels, 
but this relation is mitigated by earnings volatility.  
[Insert TABLE XII here] 
Table XIII shows regression results of future earnings levels on dividend changes from the 
nonlinear models. From the base model (Column I), a significant positive relation between positive 
dividend changes and first-year earnings levels can be found. It also seems that dividend decreases 
are positively associated with first-year earnings levels, which is consistent with the dividend sig-
naling hypothesis. We then rerun the test using the modified nonlinear model that controls for the 
interaction between dividend changes and earnings volatility. Column II shows the results. A sig-
nificant relation between positive dividend changes and both first and second year future earnings 
can be seen. The coefficients are 0.044 when τ =1 and 0.044 when τ=2. The coefficients for the 
interaction term are significant at -0.041 and -0.068, which suggests the existence of a mitigating 
effect between earnings volatility and the signaling power of dividend increases. These findings 
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are hidden under the base models, indicating the importance of the inclusion of earnings volatility. 
However, like most prior tests, no similar evidence is found for dividend decreases.  
[Insert TABLE XIII here] 
Overall, the results in this section indicate that, after considering the effect of earnings 
volatility on dividend signaling, earnings levels are positively related to dividend increases, re-
gardless of which assumption of earnings expectations is used. Furthermore, we also find evidence 
that supports the existence of the effect of earnings volatility on the signaling of dividend increases. 
6 Conclusion 
The traditional dividend signaling theory suggests that dividend changes have information content 
on firms’ future profitability. Using a liner model of earnings expectations, Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
find evidence that dividend increases are positively associated with future earnings changes. How-
ever, Grullon et al. (2005), after controlling for the nonlinearities of earnings expectations, do not 
find a similar result. They therefore contend that only incorrectly specified models could possibly 
show evidence that supports the information content of changes in dividend. 
In this paper, we show that regardless of which model of earnings expectations is used, 
there is a positive association between dividend increases and firms’ future profitability. However, 
this positive effect is mitigated by higher current earnings volatility. Specifically, we find that for 
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firms with high earnings volatility, a dividend increase signals a reduction in future earnings vol-
atility rather than an increase in future earnings. For firms with low earnings volatility, a dividend 
increase signals a favorable prospect in firms’ profitability. This explains why previous research 
papers cannot find consistent evidence for dividend signaling when earnings volatility is ignored. 
Additionally, consistent with previous literature, we cannot reach any solid conclusion for divi-
dend decreases.  
Our study has important implications for corporate finance discipline. First, we revalidate 
the traditional dividend signaling theory that there is a positive association between dividend in-
creases and future profitability. We show that this relation holds regardless of which assumption 
of linear expectation is used, linear or non-linear. Second, we find that earnings volatility has a 
negative impact on the relation between dividend increases and future prospects; specifically, the 
signaling effect on future earnings amplifies in low-volatility firms and diminishes in high-vola-
tility firms. Third, we propose that dividend changes could signal earnings volatility rather than 
earnings; for high-volatility firms, a dividend increase signals a reduction in earnings volatility. 
We provide strong evidence in support of dividend signaling and we believe our findings shed new 
light on the controversy on the subject of the information content of dividend changes.  
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of Variables  
∆Eτ The annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the 
dividend event year (year 0) deflated by the book value of equity in year-1. 
RΔDiv0 The annual dividend change in a fiscal year, calculated as the annualized rate of 
quarterly dividend changes ΔDivt,q.   
DPC (DNC) A dummy variable that takes one for dividend increases (decrease) and zero oth-
erwise. 
EVτ The industry-adjusted earnings volatility in year τ relative to the dividend event 
year (year 0), measured as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items on the book value of total assets over a five-year rolling pe-
riod, adjusted by its industry average based on 2-digit SIC code.  
∆EV5 The five year change in adjusted earnings volatility following the dividend event, 
calculated as EV5 - EV0.  
DHEV0 
(DLEV0) 
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm’s current volatility level belongs to the 
top (bottom) 25% of the entire sample volatilities.  
DFE0 ROE0 – E[ROE0], where E[ROE0]is calculated as the fitted value from the annual 
cross-sectional regressions of ROE0 on the natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets in year -1, the nature logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year 
-1, and firms’ return-on-equity in year -1 relative to the dividend event year. 
NDFED0 
(PDFED0) 
A dummy variable that takes one if DFE0 is negative (positive).  
CE0 The earnings change in the dividend event year deflated by the book value of 
common equity in year -1 
NCED0 
(PCED0) 
A dummy variable that takes one if CE0 is negative (positive). 
ROEτ Return-on-equity, measured as the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ 
deflated by the book value of equity in year τ.  
ROAτ 
 
Return-on-asset, defined either as the ratio of operating income before deprecia-
tion to the book value of total assets in year τ, or the ratio of income before ex-
traordinary items to the book value of total assets in year τ. 
MB-1 Market-to-book ratio, measured as the natural logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio in year -1. 
SIZE-1 Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in 
year -1. 
LEV-1 Leverage, defined as the ratio of total long term debt to book value of total assets. 
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TABLE I 
Variable Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of major dependent and independent variables. The annual dividend 
change RΔDivt of a specific fiscal year t is defined as the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes. 
∆Eτ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ deflated by the book value of 
equity in year -1. EV0 in the industry-adjusted cash flow volatility. ∆EV5 is the five year change in adjusted 
earnings volatility following the dividend event. All variables have been winsorized at 1st and 99th of the 
empirical distribution. 
 Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max N 
A. Dividend Increases 
R∆𝐷𝐼𝑉 0.163 0.149 0.001 0.068 0.118 0.2 0.750 15,207 
∆E1 0.010 0.081 -0.481 -0.011 0.015 0.040 0.420 14,493 
∆E2 0.013 0.095 -0.549 -0.012 0.017 0.046 0.474 14,040 
EV0 0.848 0.698 0.093 0.415 0.639 1.028 7.195 8,648 
∆EV5 0.128 0.721 -5.122 -0.156 0.047 0.311 5.638 5,555 
B. Dividend Decreases 
R∆𝐷𝐼𝑉 -0.398 0.119 -0.5 -0.5 -0.444 -0.333 -0.001 1,307 
∆E1 0.024 0.115 -0.481 -0.016 0.022 0.071 0.420 1,226 
∆E2 0.015 0.125 -0.548 -0.021 0.019 0.062 0.474 1,174 
EV0 1.234 0.898 0.113 0.630 0.983 1.525 5.757 694 
∆EV5 -0.120 0.911 -4.939 -0.427 -0.070 0.274 3.281 361 
C. No Changes 
R∆𝐷𝐼𝑉 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,228 
∆E1 0.007 0.111 -0.481 -0.024 0.014 0.047 0.420 18,736 
∆E2 0.010 0.125 -0.548 -0.024 0.016 0.054 0.474 17,963 
EV0 1.062 0.815 0.116 0.548 0.830 1.310 8.460 10,488 
∆EV5 0.088 0.901 -4.937 -0.284 0.012 0.376 7.028 5,320 
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TABLE II 
Portfolios of Changes in Earnings and Earnings Volatility Based on Four Quartiles 
of Dividend Increases/Decreases and Four Quartiles of Adjusted EV 
∆E τ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the dividend event year 
(year 0) deflated by the book value of equity in year-1. ∆EV is the change in earnings volatility in the 5 
years following dividend increases. PC1, PC2, PC3 and PC4 represent 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles of divi-
dend increases respectively. NC12, NC3 and NC4 represent 1st and 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles of dividend 
increases respectively. EV1, EV2, EV3 and EV4 represent 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles of industry adjusted 
cash flow volatility for all dividend increase/decrease firm-year observations. Differences between 1st and 
4th quartiles (extremes) are calculated. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels.                
(I) Dividend Increases 
 
 
I-A:  Average ∆E1 
EV EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between  
EV1 and EV4 
PC1 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.003 
PC2 0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.015 - 
PC3 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.014 - 
PC4 0.013 -0.0002 0.014 0.002 -0.011 
Difference between 
PC1 and PC4 
0.010** - - -0.004  
I-B: Average ∆E2 
 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between  
EV1 and EV4 
PC1 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.005 
PC2 0.014 0.002 0.007 0.005 - 
PC3 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.008 - 
PC4 0.011 0.007 -0.00001 -0.004 -0.015 
Difference between 
PC1 and PC4 
0.001 - - -0.019**  
I-C: Average ∆EV 
 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between  
EV1 and EV4 
PC1 0.357 0.204 0.117 -0.195 -0.552*** 
PC2 0.298 0.303 0.198 -0.294 - 
PC3 0.322 0.295 0.074 -0.281 - 
PC4 0.368 0.319 0.139 -0.390 -0.758*** 
Difference between 
PC1 and PC4 
0.011 - - -0.195***  
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(II) Dividend Decreases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II-A: Average ∆E1 
 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between  
EV1 and EV4 
NC12 -0.003 0.021 0.030 0.083 0.086*** 
NC3 0.007 0.018 0.002 0.046 - 
NC4 0.005 0.023 0.024 0.014 0.009 
Difference between 
NC12 and NC4 0.008 - - -0.069*  
II-B: Average ∆E2 
 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between 
 EV1 and EV4 
NC12 0.021 0.018 -0.006 -0.008 -0.029 
NC3 0.010 -0.010 0.016 0.034 - 
NC4 0.012 -0.010 -0.005 0.023 0.011 
Difference between 
NC12 and NC4 
-0.009 - - 0.031  
II-C: Average ∆EV 
 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 Difference between  
EV1 and EV4 
NC12 0.464 0.082 -0.238 -0.935 -1.399*** 
NC3 0.277 0.143 -0.121 -1.008 - 
NC4 0.206 0.246 -0.00002 -1.016 -1.222*** 
Difference between 
NC12 and NC4 
-0.258** - - -0.081  
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TABLE III 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes 
Using Fama-Macbeth Procedure (Linear Models)  
Eг is the incomes before extraordinary items in year г with year 0 as the event year. B-1 is the book value of 
equity at the end of year -1. R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC 
(DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. 
EVadj0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. ROEτ-1 is equal to the earnings before extraor-
dinary items in year τ-1 scaled by the book value of equity in year τ-1. Average R2 is the average adjusted 
R2 of the cross sectional-regressions. We use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-stage procedure to estimate 
the coefficients. We first run the annual cross-sectional regressions using observations only in that year; we 
then compute the mean coefficients and t-statistics. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant  0.018*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
 (3.27) (5.34) (3.20) (5.25) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.077*** 0.070*** 
 (4.02) (3.62) (4.10) (2.91) 
DPC0*EV0   0.008*** 0.013*** 
   (2.84) (5.66) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.052*** -0.069*** 
   (-2.81) (-3.20) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.013 0.029* 0.011 0.005 
 (-0.92) (1.92) (0.38) (0.19) 
DNC0*EV0   0.025 0.062** 
   (1.09) (2.77) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   0.050 0.156*** 
   (0.84) (2.92) 
ROEτ-1 -0.131*** -0.172*** -0.151*** -0.191*** 
 (-5.26) (-8.72) (-5.42) (-9.53) 
∆E0 -0.095** 0.118 -0.078* -0.023 
 (-2.55) (-0.94) (-1.82) (-0.94) 
Average Adjusted R2 0.063 0.054 0.084 0.069 
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TABLE IV 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes 
Using Fama-MacBeth Procedure (Nonlinear Models)  
Eг is the earnings before extraordinary items in year г with year 0 as the event year. B-1 is the book value of 
equity at the end of year -1. R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC 
(DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. 
EVadj0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 – E[ROE0], where ROE0 
is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total common/ordinary equity in year 0 and E[ROE0] is 
the fitted value form the cross-sectional regressions of ROE0 on the logarithm of total assets in year -1, the 
logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in tear -1, and ROE-1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive).  CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NCED0 (PCED0) 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive). Average R2 is the average adjusted 
R2 of the cross sectional-regressions. We use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-stage procedure to estimate 
the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: Base Model  II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant -0.008*** 0.008** -0.009*** 0.0076* 
 (-2.78) (2.38) (-2.95) (1.97) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.010 0.009 0.068*** 0.006 
 (0.98) (0.94) (3.41) (0.31) 
DPC0*EV0   0.005* 0.007*** 
   (1.74) (3.02) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.053** -0.032 
   (-2.77) (-1.54) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.004 0.019 -0.0068 -0.0026 
 (-0.25) (1.28) (-0.30) (-0.09) 
DNC0* EV0   0.021 0.042* 
   (0.96) (2.00) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   0.055 0.112** 
   (1.14) (2.16) 
DFE0 -0.113 -0.146* -0.126 -0.181** 
 (-1.51) (-1.84) (-1.70) (-2.14) 
NDFED0*DFE0 -0.364*** -0.019 -0.410*** -0.022 
 (-2.90) (-0.15) (-2.98) (-0.16) 
NDFED0*DFE02 0.007 -0.127 -0.026 -0.405 
 (0.03) (-0.54) (-0.11) (-1.23) 
PDFED0*DFE02 0.063 0.378 0.259 0.420 
 (0.16) (0.99) (0.65) (1.05) 
CE0 0.276*** 0.079 0.287*** 0.120 
 (3.96) (1.00) (4.79) (1.67) 
NCED0*CE0 -0.124 0.011 -0.098 0.012 
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 (-1.06) (0.08) (-0.81) (0.08) 
NCED0*CE02 0.450 0.200 0.720** 0.642 
 (1.36) (0.59) (2.10) (1.27) 
PCED0*CE02 -0.829*** -0.517* -0.959*** -0.596** 
 (-3.78) (-1.96) (-4.51) (-2.47) 
Average Adjusted R2 0.116 0.033 0.143 0.043 
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TABLE V 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes 
Using Rogers Standard Errors (Linear Models) 
∆E τ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the dividend event 
year (year 0) deflated by the book value of equity in year-1. R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly 
dividend changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases 
(decreases) and 0 otherwise. EV0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. ROEτ-1 is equal to the 
earnings before extraordinary items in year τ-1 scaled by the book value of equity in year τ-1.*, ** and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant  0.034*** 0.019*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 
 (6.84) (3.26) (6.92) (3.69) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.053*** 
 (6.54) (3.82) (5.04) (3.41) 
DPC0*EV0   0.007*** 0.013*** 
   (3.07) (5.39) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.033*** -0.062*** 
   (-2.6) (-3.94) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.019* 0.023* 0.035* 0.013 
 (-1.80) (1.90) (1.69) (0.5) 
DNC0*EV0   -0.005 0.035** 
   (-0.27) (2.54) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.058 0.085** 
   (-1.27) (2.3) 
ROEτ-1 -0.127*** -0.177*** -0.152*** -0.206*** 
 (-7.70) (-13.25) (-8.14) (-13.2) 
∆E0 -0.090*** 0.000 -0.103*** -0.005 
 (-5.52) (0.00) (-5.37) (-0.33) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.059 0.070 0.074 
Firm-year  
Observations 
27,308 26,098 19,135 18,364 
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TABLE VI 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes 
Using Rogers Standard Errors (Nonlinear Models)  
∆Eτ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the dividend event year 
(year 0) deflated by the book value of equity in year-1. R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend 
changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (de-
creases) and 0 otherwise. EV0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 
– E[ROE0], where ROE0 is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total common/ordinary equity 
in year 0 and E[ROE0] is the fitted value form the cross-sectional regressions of ROE0 on the logarithm of 
total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in tear -1, and ROE-1. NDFED0 
(PDFED0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive).  CE0 is equal to (E0-
E-1)/B-1. NCED0 (PCED0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive). *, ** 
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.48) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-0.35) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.019*** 0.006 0.055*** 0.009 
 (2.97) (0.89) (4.55) (0.6) 
DPC0*EV0   0.005*** 0.007*** 
   (2.8) (3.36) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.045*** -0.037** 
   (-3.87) (-2.38) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.007 0.010 0.009 0.010 
 (-0.69) (0.81) (0.44) (0.39) 
DNC0* EV0   -0.012 0.021* 
   (-0.6) (1.66) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.043 0.049 
   (-0.96) (1.43) 
DFE0 -0.109* -0.142** -0.099 -0.168** 
 (-1.77) (-2.09) (-1.46) (-2.21) 
NDFED0*DFE0 -0.410*** -0.035 -0.452*** -0.026 
 (-3.81) (-0.31) (-3.63) (-0.19) 
NDFED0*DFE02 -0.378* -0.116 -0.318 -0.211 
 (-1.76) (-0.57) (-1.29) (-0.89) 
PDFED0*DFE02 0.152 0.157 0.277 0.172 
 (0.56) (0.58) (0.96) (0.57) 
CE0 0.332*** 0.053 0.309*** 0.085 
 (6.58) (0.92) (5.62) (1.25) 
NCED0*CE0 -0.109 0.070 -0.133 0.026 
 (-1.24) (0.69) (-1.27) (0.21) 
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NCED0*CE02 1.014*** 0.166 0.821*** 0.230 
 (3.74) (0.57) (2.67) (0.74) 
PCED0*CE02 -0.977*** -0.216 -1.001*** -0.306 
 (-5.05) (-1.07) (-4.94) (-1.29) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.031 0.105 0.034 
Firm-year Observations 26,885 25,698 18,969 18,204 
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TABLE VII 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes  
In the Presence of High and/or Low-Volatility Firms (Modified Linear Models) 
DHEV0 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is larger than 75% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. DLEV0 is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is smaller than 25% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. ∆Eτ is the annual change 
in earnings before extraordinary items in year τ relative to the dividend event year (year 0) deflated by the 
book value of equity in year-1. R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC 
(DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. 
ROEτ-1 is equal to the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ-1 scaled by the book value of equity in 
year τ-1. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: DHEV0 II: DLEV0 III: Both DHEVadj0  
and DLEVadj0 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.017*** 
 (7.06) (3.95) (7.14) (3.98) (7.01) (2.85) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.014 0.049*** 0.009 
 (5.79) (2.79) (4.44) (1.10) (4.67) (0.66) 
DPC0*DHEV0 0.012*** 0.017***   0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (2.75) (3.52)   (2.87) (2.98) 
DPC0*DLEV0   0.005* 0.011*** 0.005** 0.009*** 
   (1.78) (4.01) (2.08) (3.01) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.046* -0.076***   -0.042* -0.054* 
 (-1.90) (-2.80)   (-1.67) (-1.77) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0   0.0002 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 
   (-0.01) (-0.24) (-0.26) (0.03) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.007 0.003 -0.020 0.036** -0.003 0.001 
 (-0.65) (0.21) (-1.56) (2.26) (-0.26) (0.04) 
DNC0*DHEV0 -0.004 0.093   -0.003 0.071** 
 (-0.10) (3.52)   (-0.07) (2.42) 
DNC0*DLEV0   0.020 -0.035 0.021 -0.037 
   (0.88) (-1.25) (0.92) (-1.26) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.045 0.266***   -0.048 0.190** 
 (-0.52) (3.73)   (-0.55) (2.48) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0   0.041 -0.158** 0.024 -0.134* 
   (0.57) (-2.10) (0.34) (-1.73) 
ROEτ-1 -0.151*** -0.203*** -0.151*** -0.201*** -0.152*** -0.118*** 
 (-8.17) (-13.10) (-8.13) (-12.93) (-8.17) (-6.45) 
∆E0 -0.105*** -0.007 -0.106*** -0.008 -0.105*** -0.259*** 
 (-5.48) (-0.41) (-5.53) (-0.47) (-5.44) (15.37) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.073 0.069 0.072 0.070 0.079 
Firm-year Observations 19,135 18,364 19,135 18,364 19,135 18,367 
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TABLE VIII 
Regressions of Future Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes  
In the Presence of High and/or Low-Volatility Firms (Modified Nonlinear Models) 
DHEV0 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is larger than 75% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. DLEV0 is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is smaller than 75% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. EV0 is the industry 
adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. ∆Eτ is the annual change in earnings before extraordinary items in 
year τ relative to the dividend event year (year 0) deflated by the book value of equity in year-1. R∆DIV0 is 
the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. DFE0 is equal to ROE0 – E[ROE0], where 
ROE0 is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total common/ordinary equity in year 0 and 
E[ROE0] is the fitted value form the cross-sectional regressions of ROE0 on the logarithm of total assets in 
year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in tear -1, and ROE-1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive).  CE0 is equal to (E0-E-1)/B-1. NCED0 
(PCED0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive). *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ∆Eτ 
 I: DHEV0 II: DLEV0 III: Both DHEVadj0  
and DLEVadj0 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.09) (-0.37) (-0.23) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.031*** -0.007 0.016* -0.017 0.027*** -0.013 
 (3.67) (-0.61) (1.74) (-1.48) (2.77) (-1.02) 
DPC0*DHEV0 0.008** 0.009**   0.009** 0.010** 
 (1.98) (2.20)   (2.22) (2.31) 
DPC0*DLEV0   0.009*** 0.004* 0.010*** 0.005* 
   (3.87) (1.68) (4.11) (1.96) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.052** -0.039   -0.049** -0.032 
 (-2.32) (-1.50)   (-2.09) (-1.18) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0   -0.011 0.009 -0.022 0.004 
   (-0.59) (0.40) (-1.12) (0.19) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 0.020 -0.006 0.002 
 (-0.92) (-0.23) (-0.52) (1.29) (-0.54) (0.1) 
DNC0*DHEV0 -0.012 0.062**   -0.011 0.062** 
 (-0.33) (2.29)   (-0.31) (2.29) 
DNC0*DLEV0   0.015 -0.047 0.016 -0.046 
   (0.70) (-1.50) (0.74) (-1.47) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.024 0.181**   -0.027 0.177** 
 (-0.29) (2.53)   (-0.33) (2.45) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0   0.011 -0.165** 0.012 -0.146* 
   (0.16) (-1.97) (0.17) (-1.74) 
DFE0 -0.102 -0.168** -0.097 -0.158** -0.098 -0.164** 
 (-1.50) (-2.21) (-1.42) (-2.06) (-1.44) (-2.15) 
NDFED0*DFE0 -0.451*** -0.026 -0.456*** -0.029 -0.458*** -0.031 
 (-3.62) (-0.19) (-3.65) (-0.21) (-3.67) (-0.23) 
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NDFED0*DFE02 -0.323 -0.212 -0.323 -0.205 -0.326 -0.212 
 (-1.31) (-0.90) (-1.31) (-0.87) (-1.33) (-0.9) 
PDFED0*DFE02 0.274 0.166 0.263 0.143 0.270 0.159 
 (0.94) (0.55) (0.90) (0.47) (0.93) (0.52) 
CE0 0.305*** 0.079 0.316*** 0.084 0.317*** 0.086 
 (5.56) (1.16) (5.76) (1.24) (5.76) (1.27) 
NCED0*CE0 -0.113 0.046 -0.140 0.021 -0.144 0.024 
 (-1.07) (0.38) (-1.34) (0.18) (-1.37) (0.2) 
NCED0*CE02 0.870*** 0.272 0.833*** 0.232 0.822*** 0.238 
 (2.83) (0.88) (2.71) (0.74) (2.67) (0.76) 
PCED0*CE02 -0.997*** -0.296 -1.026*** -0.315 -1.021*** -0.312 
 (-4.95) (-1.26) (-5.08) (-1.33) (-5.06) (-1.32) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.033 0.104 0.033 0.105 0.034 
Firm-year Observations 18,969 18,204 18,969 18,204 18,969 18,204 
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TABLE IX 
Regressions of Future Volatility Changes on Dividend Changes  
In the Presence of High and/or Low-Volatility Firms 
DHEV0 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is larger than 75% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. DLEV0 is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if EV0 is smaller than 75% of all EV0 and 0 otherwise. EV0 is the industry 
adjusted earnings volatility in year 0. ∆EV5 is the five year change in adjusted earnings volatility following 
the dividend event.  R∆DIV0 is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. MB -1 is the 
natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1. SIZE-1 is the natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets in year -1. LEV-1 is the ratio of total long term debt to book value of total assets. *, ** and 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ΔEV5 
 5 -Year  3-Year 
 I: DHEV0 II: DLEV0  III: Both DHEVadj0 
and DLEVadj0 
IV: Both DHEVadj0 and 
DLEVadj0 
Constant 0.854*** 0.882*** 0.892*** 0.376*** 
 (7.85) (8.23) (8.10) (6.32) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 -0.354*** -0.328*** -0.313*** -0.092 
 (-3.85) (-3.81) (-3.28) (-1.21) 
DPC0*DHEV0 0.230***  0.235*** 0.084* 
 (3.22)  (3.25) (1.82) 
DPC0*DLEV0  -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.064** 
  (-2.85) (-2.77) (-2.23) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.562**  -0.607** -0.450** 
 (-2.14)  (-2.27) (-2.40) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0  0.283 0.267 0.040 
  (1.46) (1.34) (0.30) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 0.138 0.355*** 0.216** -0.014 
 (1.59) (3.26) (2.31) (-0.16) 
DNC0*DHEV0 -0.386  -0.382 -0.488*** 
 (-1.55)  (-1.54) (-2.77) 
DNC0*DLEV0  -0.419** -0.423** -0.275* 
  (-2.12) (-2.15) (-1.67) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DHEV0 -0.563  -0.650 -1.295*** 
 (-0.90)  (-1.04) (-2.88) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*DLEV0  -1.349** -1.217** -0.686 
  (-2.37) (-2.15) (-1.51) 
EV0 -0.583*** -0.572*** -0.601*** -0.333*** 
 (-12.65) (-12.73) (-11.77) (-11.24) 
MB-1   0.053** 0.059** 0.055** 0.012 
 (2.28) (2.56) (-1.96) (0.72) 
SIZE-1   -0.016** -0.013 -0.015*** -0.008* 
 (-2.15) (-1.78*) (-1.96) (-1.71) 
LEV-1   -0.258*** -0.236** -0.257*** -0.165** 
 (-2.66) (-2.44) (-2.66) (-2.53) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.13 
Firm-year Observations 11,153 11,153 11,153 13,998 
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TABLE X 
Regressions of Changes in ROA on Dividend Changes  
(Linear Models)  
ROAτ is defined either as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of total assets 
in year τ, or the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets in year τ. R∆DIV0 
is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. EV0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility 
in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 
0 otherwise. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 Dependent Variable - ROAτ - ROAτ-1 
                     A: Linear Models - ROA (oibdp/at) B: Linear Models - ROA (ib/at) 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (11.86) (8.01) (10.21) (7.77) (7.88) (3.89) (6.72) (3.93) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.001 -0.0015 0.010** 0.012** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.49) (-0.59) (2.18) (2.49) (4.75) (3.22) (5.18) (4.89) 
DPC0*EV0   0.001* 0.002***   0.003*** 0.004*** 
   (1.91) (3.78)   (4.24) (5.64) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.010** -0.021***   -0.015*** -0.023*** 
   (-2.46) (-4.55)   (-3.58) (-4.77) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.012*** -0.0027 -0.005 0.013* -0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 
 (-3.02) (-0.67) (-0.62) (1.68) (-1.36) (1.09) (1.14) (1.09) 
DNC0*EV0   -0.002 0.010**   0.001 0.010* 
   (-0.23) (2.22)   (0.1) (1.87) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.009 0.010   -0.010 0.019 
   (-0.58) (0.97)   (-0.6) (1.42) 
ROAτ-1 -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.186*** -0.224*** -0.199*** -0.252*** 
 (-21.52) (-22.68) (-18.02) (-19.22) (-21.52) (-23.68) (-19.35) (-22.79) 
(ROA0 –ROA-1) 0.001 -0.043*** -0.015 -0.048*** -0.095*** -0.0002 -0.118*** -0.006 
 (0.12) (-4.81) (-1.28) (-4.48) (-8.66) (-0.02) (-9.45) (-0.5) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.040 0.090 0.101 0.104 0.106 0.119 0.123 
Firm-year  
Observations 
27,215 26,003 19,071 18,295 27,310 26,099 19,133 18,361 
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TABLE XI 
Regressions of Changes in ROA on Dividend Changes  
(Nonlinear Models) 
ROAτ is defined either as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of total assets 
in year τ, or the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of total assets in year τ. R∆DIV0 
is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. EV0 is the industry adjusted earnings volatility 
in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 
0 otherwise. Where DFE0 is ROA0 – E[ROA0], the fitted value of from the annual cross-sectional regres-
sions of ROA0 on the logarithm of the book value of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-
book ratio in year -1 and ROA-1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) takes one if DFE0 is negative (positive) and zero 
otherwise. CE0 is ROA0 – ROA-1. NCED0 (PCED0) takes one if CE0 is positive (negative) and zero other-
wise. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ROAτ - ROAτ-1 
                     A: Nonlinear Models - ROA (oibdp/at) B: Nonlinear Models - ROA (ib/at) 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant -0.003* -0.005*** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.003** -0.006*** 
 (-1.86) (-2.78) (-2.02) (-2.69) (-1.35) (-2.86) (-1.97) (-3.07) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.001 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.006*** 0.011*** -0.001 
 (-3.13) (-3.79) (0.19) (0.1) (-0.45) (-2.86) (2.61) (-0.26) 
DPC0*EV0   0.000 0.001   0.001 0.001 
   (-0.47) (1.03)   1.56 (1.56) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.008* -0.015***   -0.013*** -0.012** 
   (-1.8) (-2.97)   (-2.84) (-2.02) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 -0.012*** -0.003 -0.008 0.011 -0.005 -0.0002 -0.007 0.003 
 (-3.18) (-0.81) (-1.15) (1.36) (-1.24) (-0.05) (-0.89) (0.39) 
DNC0*EV0   -0.007 0.005   -0.003 0.005 
   (-1.01) (1.33)   (-0.49) (1.07) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.019 0.002   -0.005 0.009 
   (-1.16) (0.26)   (-0.33) (0.73) 
DFE0 -0.423*** -0.419*** -0.425*** -0.418*** -0.259*** -0.256*** -0.266*** -0.247*** 
 (-11.91) (-11.67) (-10.02) (-10.2) (-4.85) (-4.88) (-4.23) (-4.24) 
NDFED0*DFE0 -0.124** 0.126** -0.087 0.093 -0.318*** -0.007 -0.411*** -0.005 
 (-2.24) (2.35) (-1.4) (1.54) (-3.86) (-0.09) (-4.16) (-0.05) 
NDFED0*DFE0
2 -0.837*** -0.093 -0.707*** -0.152 0.024 -0.701 -0.920 -0.577 
 (-3.01) (-0.41) (-2.87) (-0.73) (0.05) (-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.01) 
PDFED0*DFE0
2 0.614*** 0.760*** 0.694*** 0.778*** -1.909*** -0.075 -1.535* -0.285 
 (3.96) (4.12) (3.83) (3.65) (-2.87) (-0.11) (-1.91) (-0.38) 
CE0 0.365*** 0.206*** 0.338*** 0.228*** 0.293*** 0.057 0.256*** 0.122* 
 (12.60) (7.24) (9.63) (7.16) (5.48) (0.96) (4.18) (1.78) 
NCED0*CE0 -0.069** -0.004 -0.053 -0.002 0.164** 0.209** 0.250*** 0.102 
 (-2.35) (-0.12) (-1.55) (-0.06) (2.15) (2.55) (2.83) (1.05) 
NCED0*CE0
2 0.021 0.276 0.324 0.658** 2.687*** 1.410*** 3.599*** 1.239** 
 (0.07) (1.05) (0.96) (2.2) (5.07) (2.60) (6.15) (1.99) 
PCED0*CE0
2 -0.744** -0.419 -0.656* -0.524 -1.215* 0.577 -0.994 -0.240 
 (-2.34) (-1.25) (-1.82) (-1.39) (-1.89) (0.77) (-1.4) (-0.29) 
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Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.058 0.072 0.068 0.110 0.039 0.126 0.044 
Firm-year  
Observations 
26,791 25,602 18,905 18,136 26,883 25,694 18,967 18,201 
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TABLE XII 
Regressions of Future Earnings Levels on Dividend Changes  
(Linear Models)  
ROEτ is earnings before extraordinary items in year τ deflated by the book value of equity in year τ.R∆DIV0 
is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. EV0 is the industry adjusted earnings 
volatility in year 0. MB-1 is the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1. SIZE-1 is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets in year -1. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ROEτ 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant 0.015*** 0.002 0.010** -0.001 
 (2.92) (0.36) (1.94) (-0.09) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.028* 
 (5.19) (3.22) (3.34) (1.64) 
DPC0*EV0   0.008*** 0.012*** 
   (4.44) (5.58) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.029** -0.043** 
   (-2.25) (-2.47) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 0.020* 0.004 0.013 0.018 
 (1.69) (0.25) (0.56) (0.58) 
DNC0*EV0   0.014 0.031* 
   (0.66) (1.85) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   0.030 0.058 
   (0.6) (1.29) 
ROE τ-1 0.620*** 0.507*** 0.601*** 0.489*** 
 (32.83) (28.11) (27.66) (23.43) 
(ROE0 – ROE-1)   -0.099*** 0.037** -0.106*** 0.028 
 (-6.61) (2.16) (-6.38) (1.45) 
MB-1 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 
 (11.34) (13.76) (10.65) (12.47) 
SIZE-1 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (5.64) (5.76) (4.85) (4.92) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.286 0.341 0.289 
Firm-year Observations 26,879 25,689 18,963 18,197 
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TABLE XIII 
Regressions of Future Earnings Levels on Dividend Changes 
(Nonlinear Models) 
ROEτ is earnings before extraordinary items in year τ deflated by the book value of equity in year τ.R∆DIV0 
is the annualized rate of quarterly dividend changes in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. NDFED0 (PDFED0) takes one if ROE0 is 
negative (positive) and zero otherwise. CE0 is equal to ROE0 – ROE -1. NCED0 (PCED0) takes one if CE0 is 
negative (positive) and zero otherwise. MB-1 is the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1. 
SIZE-1 is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in year -1. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
Dependent Variable - ROEτ 
 I: Base Model II: Modified Model 
 τ=1 τ=2 τ=1 τ=2 
Constant 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (0.68) (0.23) (0.21) (0.3) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0 0.013*** 0.012 0.044*** 0.044** 
 (2.66) (1.55) (3.82) (2.2) 
DPC0*EV0   0.008*** 0.013*** 
   (4.36) (6.01) 
DPC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   -0.041*** -0.068*** 
   (-3.49) (-3.27) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0 0.031*** 0.016 -0.022 -0.003 
 (2.72) (1.06) (-0.91) (-0.1) 
DNC0*EV0   0.013 0.026 
   (0.62) (1.08) 
DNC0*RΔDiv0*EV0   0.072 0.076 
   (1.41) (1.32) 
ROE0 0.733*** 0.458*** 0.702*** 0.399*** 
 (20.06) (8.82) (16.78) (6.81) 
NDFED0* ROE0 -0.466*** -0.488*** -0.450*** -0.495*** 
 (-3.59) (-3.12) (-3.11) (-2.89) 
NDFED0* ROE02 0.499 -0.111 0.572 -0.522 
 (1.03) (-0.19) (1.07) (-0.82) 
PDFED0* ROE02 0.112 0.406*** 0.209** 0.525*** 
 (1.14) (2.76) (2.06) (3.42) 
CE0 0.034 -0.107* 0.041 -0.094 
 (0.81) (-1.84) (0.83) (-1.39) 
NCED0*CE0 0.088 0.367*** 0.023 0.337*** 
 (1.31) (4.08) (0.29) (3.24) 
NCED0*CE02 0.486*** 0.767*** 0.315* 0.793*** 
 (3.06) (3.44) (1.81) (3.23) 
PCED0*CE02 -0.457** -0.015 -0.445** -0.065 
 (-2.37) (-0.05) (-2.08) (-0.22) 
MB-1 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 
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 (6.84) (7.16) (6.15) (6.7) 
SIZE-1 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (5.34) (6.97) (4.06) (5.57) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.205 0.369 0.214 
Firm-year Observations 26,879 25,701 18,963 18,206 
 
